Professor Foad Izadi’s proposal to target US-host Persian Gulf states desalination and energy infrastructure exposes a real asymmetry in the US-Iran confrontation. However, it must be understood correctly: this is not a threat of retaliation after Iran is struck, but a final, preemptive warning that if US strikes continue, Iran will destroy the economic assets the US is fighting for before Washington can secure them. Can such a threat deter escalation when carrying it out would inflict mass civilian harm and face serious legal constraints?
The US-Iran war has settled into a grinding strategic stalemate. On one side, the US seeks to secure strategic oil resources and regional economic dominance; on the other, Iran seeks to break that stranglehold. On August 3, President Trump threatened Iran with “decapitation” and a substantially expanded attack if it failed to reach a deal; those remarks followed earlier threats against civilian infrastructure like Iranian bridges, power plants and heavily fortified nuclear-linked complex at Pickaxe Mountain. While Trump insists that negotiations are ongoing, Iran has denied direct talks with Washington, only confirming separate discussions it is currently engaged in with Oman over arrangements for navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.
Neither side, however, has found a low-cost path to a decisive victory. The 40-day bombing campaign from February 28 to April 8 did not compel Iranian capitulation, while the deeply buried nuclear-linked complex at Pickaxe Mountain remained strategically relevant. Iranian missile attacks and restrictions on Hormuz, meanwhile, imposed serious regional costs without forcing an explicit US military withdrawal.
In this context, Professor Foad Izadi at the Faculty of World Studies, Tehran University, has articulated a new, particularly stark version of a coercive argument circulating among Tehran’s strategic debate circles.
“It argues that Tehran must abandon the strike-ceasefire-negotiate cycle and threaten large-scale retaliation against desalination and energy-export infrastructure in Persian Gulf Arab states unless US military operations cease and Washington withdraws from the region.”
Proponents argue this would trigger a prolonged global energy and water shock, making the continuation of the war economically and politically unbearable for Washington. But this is also where strategic logic collides with legal and moral limits. A state’s right to self-defense does not erase the requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack—nor does it make civilian infrastructure in third states automatically lawful targets.
The central question is narrower: under what conditions could Iran’s threat of reciprocal infrastructure escalation shift Washington’s preferences from continued strikes toward an operational pause or renewed negotiation? Our judgment is that Izadi identifies a real deterrent vulnerability. The proposition is most defensible as a warning about the potentially uncontrollable costs of infrastructure escalation. For analyzing this proposition, we have relied on advanced methodologies involving legal, humanitarian, Islamic Law, and game theory analysis.
The Izadi Proposition
Izadi’s framework turns the vulnerability of Persian Gulf States into a coercive bargaining chip. His blueprint is notable for its specificity:
- Publish a Target List: Izadi explicitly calls for releasing a public list of desalination and energy facilities across the Persian Gulf Arab states. In signal-detection terms—plainly put—this removes ambiguity. Washington can no longer claim ignorance about Iran’s red lines.
- The ‘Two-Year’ Rule: Targets must be selected and attacked so that reconstruction takes at least two years. Limited, cosmetic strikes, Izadi warns, would simply be viewed by Trump as “reconstruction projects for American companies.” Only a multi-year outage creates the deterrent effect Tehran needs. For the US, this means a two-year loss of regional oil revenues and economic leverage. Izadi argues this timeline is critical because it exceeds the US electoral horizon and makes the cost of war politically unbearable, rather than just a temporary price spike.
- Close the Strait of Hormuz (for two months): Izadi argues that the US has not yet paid a sufficient economic price for the war. A real, sustained closure of the Strait would inflict that pain.
- Collect Tolls: Izadi points out that if Iran doesn’t collect tolls, the US and British insurance companies will. Since Iran is not a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, collecting customary tolls is legally defensible. International estimates (ranging from $70 billion to $110 billion annually) suggest the Strait is a “money-printing machine” that could offset sanction losses.
The Asymmetric Weakness: The Legibility of the Iranian Counter-threat
The asymmetry is significant. Iran draws only a small share of its water from coastal desalination, while several Persian Gulf States depend heavily on centralized desalination—especially for potable water. A major loss of those systems could therefore produce severe humanitarian and economic disruption.
The model below asks whether that vulnerability can alter US incentives. It does not estimate the actors’ true utilities or predict their behavior with certainty: its payoffs are illustrative, showing the preference orderings under which an Iranian infrastructure threat could deter further escalation. The result is conditional on Iranian resolve and capability, Persian Gulf mitigation capacity, and Washington’s sensitivity to regional economic disruption.
Sequential Decision Tree (Visual Structure)
Conditional backward induction: under the assigned payoffs, Iran prefers retaliation to folding (-8 > -15). If Washington accepts that preference ordering, an operational pause is preferable to escalation (-5 > -20). This is a model result under the stated assumptions, not a forecast.
Signal Detection Theory: The Conservative Decision Criterion
US decision-makers process strategic intelligence through noisy, high-entropy channels. Under a Signal Detection Theory (SDT) framework, Washington must evaluate Iranian posture to determine whether Tehran’s threat represents Noise (a bluff) or a Signal (real operational preparation).
| US Decision / True State | Iran Threat is Noise (Bluff) |
Iran Threat is Signal (Real Prep) |
|---|---|---|
| Escalate / Deep Strikes | Correct Rejection (+10, -10) US neutralizes targets without retaliation. |
Miss: Strategic Disaster (-25, -10)
Catastrophic Failure: Total destruction of Gulf energy/water grid. |
| Hold / Pause |
False Alarm (-5, +8)
US deterred by bluff; accepts weaker deal. |
Hit: Successful Avoidance (-5, +15) US prevents regional economic collapse. |
Because the penalty of an SDT “Miss” (underestimating Iranian intent and suffering total grid collapse) leads to an existential regional catastrophe, it infinitely exceeds the penalty of a “False Alarm” (accepting a tactical pause or weaker MOU based on a bluff). Given Iran’s track record of converting asymmetric threats into operational reality during this conflict, its warnings carry a high prior probability of being acted upon. Consequently, US Command operates under a heavily Conservative Criterion (β >> 1). This mathematical asymmetry forces Washington to treat even low-probability Iranian infrastructure threats, in addition to high-probability ones, if it were to adopt the Izadi Doctrine as real Signals driving tactical pauses regardless of public posturing.
The Simplified Payoff Matrix
In basic game theory terms, we are looking at a “Game of Chicken” with uneven stakes. The matrix below summarizes the strategic outcomes:
| US Strategy | Iran: Fold (Absorb Hits) |
Iran: Retaliate (GCC Grid / Two-Year Doctrine) |
|---|---|---|
| Deep Strikes |
(+10, -10)
US destroys targets; Iran loses leverage. |
(-20, -15)
Catastrophic Failure: Global oil shock, grid collapse, regional humanitarian disaster. |
| Pause / MOU |
(+2, +2)
Attrition managed; markets stay intact. |
(-5, +8)
Current Equilibrium: Stalemate continues; Iran retains leverage. |
Because Iran can survive the destruction of Persian Gulf infrastructure better than the US and its Arab partners can, the threat is credible enough to force Washington into a conservative, cautious stance.
The Israel Factor
Perhaps the strongest real-world validation of this framework comes not from Tehran, but from Tel Aviv.
On July 28, 2026, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz publicly stated that the United States was blocking Israeli strikes on Iranian energy targets. Washington feared that Iran would retaliate against neighboring states and trigger a global oil crisis. This public acknowledgment is critical. It proves that anticipated regional and market consequences can actually constrain the target choices of a militarily superior coalition. Plainly, the US is already “ducking” to avoid the very scenario Izadi envisions.
The US has clear leverage over Israel—through resupply logistics and diplomatic cover—and it is currently using that leverage to restrain an ally’s more aggressive impulses. This suggests the model’s central mechanism is already operational, even if Washington hasn’t formally acknowledged it.
The Danger Zone
However, a doctrine that works well as a threat can become a catastrophe if executed as a blueprint.
Izadi’s proposition moves from conditional retaliation to unconditional preemption. Currently, Iran is perceived by much of the Global South as defending itself against US aggression. If Tehran strikes first—hitting civilian infrastructure in third countries without being attacked—it loses the retaliatory moral high ground.
The Backfire Scenarios:
- Uniting the Coalition: A preemptive strike on Gulf soil could provide the US with the domestic political cover it currently lacks to launch a full-scale ground invasion of Iran.
- Desperation among Gulf States: If facing an existential water collapse, the Persian Gulf Arab states may grant Washington carte blanche to use their territories for an all-out air campaign—potentially even inviting Israeli nuclear guarantees.
- Emergency Mitigation: The “two-year” assumption is shaky. The US and its allies could deploy emergency floating desalination barges and mobile reverse-osmosis units within 6 to 8 months, shortening the pain horizon.
The Legal and Moral Constraints
Strategic expediency cannot erase international law or Islamic legal traditions.
Under International Humanitarian Law, attacks on civilian infrastructure are strictly prohibited unless they constitute a definite military advantage. Attacking water systems essential for civilian survival violates the principles of distinction and proportionality.
Islamic legal traditions—which profoundly influence Iranian legitimacy—likewise place strict limits on intentionally targeting civilians and inflicting collective punishment. For Tehran, the dilemma is not international law versus Islamic law, but coercive expediency versus the constraints found in both—and the reputational costs that mass civilian deprivation could impose, particularly across constituencies in the Global South and within international pro-Palestine and left intellectual/tech classes.
The Bottom Line: If Washington believes Iran both intends and has the capacity to impose severe regional costs, the expected cost of further strikes rises. This strengthens incentives for restraint. The model shows that an operational pause or renewed bargaining becomes more attractive than risking a regional catastrophe.
This serves as a deterrent framework, not as an execution plan. Deliberately attacking desalination and other infrastructure indispensable to civilian survival would carry potentially prohibitive humanitarian, legal, political, and reputational costs. Those costs may themselves reduce the threat’s credibility.
“The Izadi proposition is most defensible as a warning about the potentially uncontrollable costs of infrastructure escalation, not as a blueprint for inflicting them.”
Iran’s asymmetric leverage is real—and the US is already behaving as if it believes it (as evidenced by the veto on Israeli strikes). The threat of infrastructure collapse is enough to force Washington to “duck.” But if Iran executes the Izadi doctrine prematurely—firing the first shot without provocation—it hands Washington the political cover it desperately needs to wage an existential war. The value of Izadi’s proposition lies in showing Washington that escalation may carry costs it cannot neatly contain. Its danger lies in assuming that threatening catastrophe is the same as controlling it.
