As the second round of indirect US-Iran negotiations opened in Geneva on Tuesday, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivered a sweeping address to thousands of people from East Azerbaijan province—a speech that was not merely a commentary on the talks, but a comprehensive articulation of where the Islamic Republic stands, how it understands the recent past, and what it expects from the future.
The timing was deliberate. With American and Iranian delegations seated in separate rooms at the Omani embassy in Geneva, Khamenei spoke to multiple audiences: to Washington, to Tehran’s negotiators, to the region, and to the Iranian people. His words were not routine rhetoric. They were a strategic document. Here is what he actually said—and what it means.
What Actually Happened in January
Let’s be clear about something. When Western media covered the January unrest, they ran the usual template: economic grievances, angry crowds, regime violence. Clean. Simple. Wrong.
The Supreme Leader was not talking about every person who took to the streets. He was talking about what happened on those two specific days when something else emerged from the crowds.
“What happened was not the movement and unrest of a group of angry youth and non-youth, but a ‘planned coup’ that was crushed under the feet of the Iranian nation.”
The distinction matters. There is a difference between a protester and an armed militant. Between someone shouting slogans and someone shooting at police. Between spontaneous anger and an organized insurrection.
Ayatollah Khamenei laid out what intelligence gathered:
“American and Israeli intelligence agencies, with the help of intelligence agencies of some other countries, had for months recruited vicious individuals or those with a tendency for viciousness, trained them abroad, gave them money and weapons, and sent them inside to sabotage and attack military and government centers.”

These were not protesters. They were operatives—trained, armed, inserted. Their goal was not to chant. It was to kill, to destroy, to create enough chaos that something larger could follow.
It worked for two days. Then it didn’t.
“The coup, with all its preparations and enormous expenses, clearly failed, and the nation emerged victorious.”
The message to Washington: we saw what you did. We know how you did it. And it failed.
“America’s next plan regarding the Islamic Republic is likely of this same style and kind.”
Try again. The result will be the same!
America’s Decline and the Logic of Confrontation
Ayatollah Khamenei situated the current confrontation within a longer historical arc—one in which the United States is not ascending but declining.
“America’s numerous economic, political, and social problems are signs of the decline and extinction of the American empire.”
This is not wishful thinking but an analytical claim. The Supreme Leader pointed to America’s internal dysfunction—its political polarization, its social crises, its economic instability—as evidence that the “empire” is fraying. The implication for negotiators: you are dealing with a power that is weaker than it appears.
Why, then, does America persist in targeting Iran?
“America’s problem with us is that it wants to swallow Iran, but the Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic prevent them from achieving this goal.”
The conflict, in this telling, is not about nuclear programs or missile ranges or regional influence. Those are symptoms. The disease is American ambition for domination—and Iran’s refusal to submit.
The Missile Program: Let’s Be Absolutely Clear
There has been chatter in Western media—you’ve seen it—that the missile program might be “on the table” in Geneva. That Iran might trade away its deterrent for sanctions relief.
The Supreme Leader addressed this. Directly. Unambiguously.
“Possessing deterrent weapons is necessary and obligatory for a nation… The Americans illogically say you should not have this type of missile or that range, while this matter concerns the Iranian nation and has nothing to do with them.”
“Necessary and obligatory.” This is not policy language. This is language of duty. The missiles are not a bargaining chip. They are not a negotiating point. They are what keep the country from being “swallowed,” to use his word.
And the American demand? “Illogical.” Which is a polite way of saying: you have no idea what you’re talking about, you have no right to ask, and the answer is no.
Anyone in Geneva who thinks otherwise is wasting their time.
Negotiating with People Who Already Know the Answer
On the talks themselves, Khamenei addressed a specific American practice that Tehran finds unacceptable: announcing the desired outcome before the negotiation begins.
“If negotiations are to take place, determining their outcome in advance is a wrong and foolish thing to do.”
He attributed this approach to “the government, the president, and some senators of America”—a broad critique of the US political class. And he added a warning:
“They do not think that this path is a dead end for them.”
The message to Geneva is clear: Iran will not accept preset conditions. Negotiations must be genuine exchanges, not performances designed to ratify American demands. This aligns with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s pre-departure statement: “I am in Geneva with real ideas to achieve a fair and equitable deal. What is not on the table: submission before threats.”
The Military Warning—And the Weapon Beneath the Waves
The passages that captured the author attention came toward the end of the Ayatollah Khamenei’s speech, and they were carefully calibrated—not just rhetoric, but signal.
“The American president repeatedly says that their military is the strongest in the world. The strongest military in the world, however, can sometimes be struck so hard that it cannot even get back on its feet.”
Then came the image that will linger:
“They keep saying, ‘We have sent an aircraft carrier toward Iran.’ Fine—an aircraft carrier is certainly a dangerous piece of equipment. But more dangerous than the carrier is the weapon capable of sending it to the bottom of the sea.”
Why?
Because some capabilities are more effective when they remain just beyond clear view. The Americans can track Iran’s missile batteries. They can count our ships, monitor our exercises, estimate our range and accuracy. But when the Supreme Leader speaks of “the weapon” in singular, deliberate terms, he is hinting at something else. Something they haven’t seen. Something that doesn’t appear in intelligence reports.

US naval commanders in the Persian Gulf know about our anti-ship ballistic missiles. They’ve watched the tests. They know we can hit moving targets at sea. That much is public.
But Ayatollah Khamenei’s language suggests there is more. A capability held in reserve. A weapon designed not for show, but for the moment it might actually be needed.
The Islamic Republic has always understood that it cannot match the US Navy ship-for-ship. We don’t need to. We only need to make the cost of an attack unacceptable. And if there is something beneath the waves—or beyond the horizon—that the Americans haven’t accounted for, then the cost is higher than they think.
This is deterrence, spoken not in boasts but in hints. The most powerful weapons are sometimes the ones you never have to use.
The 47-Year Admission
Khamenei began his military remarks by quoting President Trump’s own words back to him:
“The US president said in one of his recent remarks that for 47 years America has been unable to eliminate the Islamic Republic; he complained about it to his own people. For 47 years, America has not been able to eliminate the Islamic Republic. That is a good admission.”
The number is precise: 47 years since the 1979 Revolution. Seven US presidents have come and gone. Sanctions have been imposed, tightened, and re-imposed. Covert actions have been attempted. Maximum pressure has been applied. And still, the Islamic Republic endures.
“I say: You, too, will not be able to do this.”
The Historical Frame—Tabriz and the Revolution
The speech was delivered on the eve of the anniversary of the February 18, 1978 uprising in Tabriz—a pivotal moment in the countdown to the Revolution. That date is not incidental.
By speaking to the people of East Azerbaijan on this day, Ayatollah Khamenei linked the current confrontation to the revolutionary movement that brought the Islamic Republic into existence. The implication is that today’s struggle is continuous with that one—that the same spirit of resistance that overthrew the Shah will outlast the current American president, and the next, and the next.
He reinforced this by invoking Imam Hussein—a name many in the West don’t know, but should.
In 680 AD, Hussein ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, refused to pledge allegiance to Yazid, a ruler he considered corrupt and illegitimate. Surrounded and outnumbered at Karbala, he chose death over submission. His martyrdom became the defining symbol of Shia Islam: righteous refusal in the face of tyranny.
Khamenei drew the line directly from Karbala to today:
“Husayn ibn Ali said, ‘Someone like me will not pledge allegiance to someone like Yazid.’ A nation like ours with this culture, this history, these lofty teachings, will not pledge allegiance to corrupt individuals like those who are today in power in America.”
For international audiences, the message is different but equally important: This is not a negotiation about centrifuges and sanctions. This is a confrontation between justice and injustice, between those who submit and those who refuse. And on matters of principle, there is no compromise.
For Iranians, this is not rhetoric. It is identity. And identity does not negotiate.
What This Means for Geneva?
The talks are happening. They will continue. Nobody expects a breakthrough overnight—the distrust is too deep, the wounds too fresh.
But the Supreme Leader has drawn the lines. They are not hidden.
The missile program? Non-negotiable. The US can stop asking.
Zero enrichment? Not happening. Iran’s rights are not bargaining chips.
Predetermined outcomes? Unacceptable. Negotiation means genuine exchange, not ratification of American demands.
Deterrence for promises? No. Sanctions relief must be real and verifiable—or there is no deal.
Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Takht-Ravanchi put it best: “We must not be stung from the same stone twice.”
The JCPOA taught us what American promises are worth. The June 2025 war taught us what American “good faith” means. We enter these talks with eyes open.
