“The West usually incorrectly interprets the supreme leader’s messages. He, however, is much clearer about his position than other Iranian leaders. In sum, Khamenei does not oppose talks with the United States, but he distrusts US intentions. He is not driven by urgency and believes the burden is on Washington, not Tehran, to demonstrate good intentions.”
In 2013, as the world debated the nuclear dossier, I wrote this analysis for Al-Monitor to cut through the noise surrounding Ayatollah Khamenei’s foreign policy.
My goal was to show that the Leader’s skepticism toward the West was not based on blind dogma, but on a specific historical memory: the coup of 1953, the support for Saddam, and the broken promises following the Afghanistan cooperation. He allowed talks to happen, but he never trusted the US.
Today, as the occupying regime of Israel—armed to the teeth by the United States—escalates its war against our nation and assassinates Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the relevance of this analysis is devastatingly clear.
The Leader understood that the American establishment views negotiation not as a path to peace, but as a tool for submission. He stated that Washington would have to prove it respected the rights of the Iranian nation before trust could be established. Instead, they chose to escalate, to kill, and to terrorize.
I am republishing this post now to honor the memory of our late Leader’s wisdom and to document for my readers that the path of resistance Iran walks today was not chosen lightly. It was chosen because the alternative—reliance on the goodwill of an empire—proved itself a dangerous illusion long ago.
The following is a version of the 2013 article:
Reading Khamenei by Mojtba Mousavi
In two speeches last month, [February 7 and 16, 2013], Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei explained that the reason he neither opposed nor saw utility in negotiations with the United States is that he did not perceive the US as either honest or trustworthy in its intentions. He allowed negotiations to proceed, but expected nothing.
Khamenei buttressed his statements with three historical examples: the 1953 US-backed coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh; US support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War from 1980-1988; and US President George W. Bush including Iran an “Axis of evil”, even after some cooperation between Washington and Tehran over Afghanistan.
Khamenei’s recent speeches warning about the perils of engagement may have seemed like more of the same, and to some extent they were, but then he did something unusual. On his official website, he published reports and interviews with three members of the Iranian delegation involved in direct talks with the United States on the issue of Iraqi security in 2007. The three made similar pronouncements about the discussions.
“Americans went deep into a swamp and had no choice to get out but to negotiate with Iran The US asked us to have talks because they were deadlocked and needed us.” Regardless, “They weren’t sincere and honest in their words and acts”. “They only wanted to reach their goals without giving any credit to us.” “The US is arrogant — thinks it is a superpower has ultimate power and can do anything it wants.”
All three delegates declared that Iran, and of course the supreme leader, is ready to talk, even with the United States, when Iran’s interests are at stake. In their judgment, however, Washington was never serious about the negotiations in which they were involved.
The statements on Khamenei’s website reflect his views. That the interviews and photos posted are of those who have experience with direct negotiations with the United States invariably signals Khamenei’s position and intention, which likely include one of the following:
He wants to talk and is signaling his desire for a respectful compromise.
He is replying to signals from the United States that he wants real talks, not a repetition of past failed experiences, such as the Iraq talks.
He does not want talks with the United States and is trying to convey to the Iranian public why he has taken that position despite some Iranian officials indicating that talks could ease some of Iran’s economic problems.
Khamenei here is doing more of the same, but perhaps with a twist. For example, 15 years ago [January 16, 1998], when the United States publicly sent signals about its readiness to talk with Tehran, the supreme leader laid out his stance in a speech revealing what he believed to be behind the offer. His words and sentiments were similar to what he is saying today:
“The United States wants to create divisions between Iranians by talking about negotiations.”
“The United States wants to tell other nations that even Iran had to give up and negotiate with America.”
“It is wrong if someone thinks that if we negotiate with the United States they will lift sanctions and give up pressuring us. The won’t.”
In each speech, after Khamenei states how Washington is insincere, he describes Iran as the rational party and explains under what conditions Tehran may nonetheless agree to talks:
“If they prove they are not after coercion or mischief.”
“Prove that they respect the rights of the Iranian nation.”
“Show mutual respect.”
“Stop supporting anti-regime groups.”
The first two options — for talks — are the least likely. In previous years, Khamenei’s speeches indicated that he was not seeking engagement with the United States, and his speeches today are similar.
Given Khamenei’s actions and words, he appears to believe that the United States does not want negotiations based on mutual interests. Rather, he thinks Washington is pursuing regime change in Iran. In addition, he perceives that world events are favorable to Iran and Islam, so he does not feel any urgency for a dialogue, especially on the nuclear issue.
So, why does Khamenei consistently say Iran will talk with the United States under certain conditions? Laying out such conditions means that Washington would have to change its policy toward Iran, but Khamenei knows this is unlikely. By publicly presenting conditions, however, Khamenei puts the ball in Washington’s court.
It is not the case that Khamenei is absolutely opposed to talks. As with the discussions on Iraq security, he may again accept a dialogue, on other issues. One red line is clear: Iran will agree to talks only on specified topics.
The West usually incorrectly interprets the supreme leader’s messages. He, however, is much clearer about his position than other Iranian leaders. In sum, Khamenei does not oppose talks with the United States, but he distrusts US intentions. He is not driven by urgency and believes the burden is on Washington, not Tehran, to demonstrate good intentions. Some leaders actually say what they mean.
