By Mostafa Entezari*

Immediately after President Trump announced US withdrawal of Iranian nuclear deal (JCPOA), his Iranian counterpart said that the country would not exit from the JCPOA, if European states guarantee Tehran’s interests clarified in the agreement. This translated into Tehran’s intensive negotiations with the Europe, Russia and China to convince them to enforce laws to neutralize US sanctions against Iran and not to follow Trump.

Europeans have a similar experience during1990s when they protected European companies against the pressure of White House and its unilateral Cuba sanctions.

Now, fearing the Europeans resistance, the United States is trying to use its regional leverages to kill the Iran deal and fight back Europeans’ initiatives. In such situation, the United States’ regional allies are trying to prevent Europe to work with Iran by their own methods and tricks.
Stressing issues including Iran- EU differences on human rights, missile programs and regional policies, is a strategy that can dissuade Europe from confronting Washington and put Europe against Iran.

In other hand, just one day after Trump’s announcement to withdraw from JCPOA, Israel attacks Syria to form a kind of confrontation with Iran and put the world against Tehran.

But Iran ignored the attacks with cleverness. However, it is anticipated that such scenarios will be implemented again. This time with a focus on issues of human rights, Iran’s military centers and specific regional challenges.
How smart Iran manages this psychological tricks, or how much Europe protects itself from the Plan? Time will tell.

 * Mostafa Entezari is a regular contributor to Iranian media including Jame-jam Daily, Iranian state TV, Fars News. He is a Phd candidate in Public Policy. @mstfentezari

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A senior Iranian Foreign Ministry official said the Iran’s nuclear deal with the P5+1 group, known as JCPOA, proved to be a success story, but only for the P5+1. He made the remarks in sideline of the Tehran Security Conference on Monday. More than 200 Iranian and international political figures and analysts attended the one-day event.  

“Iran has fully lived up to its commitments regarding the deal as it has been repeatedly, 10 times, confirmed by the IAEA. However, Iran and the Iranian people would not remember the deal as a success story as the other side of the agreement has not fully honored its obligations. As a matter of fact, Iran has not benefited from easing of the sanctions,” he said during a meeting with a number of European politicians, according to Iran’s View Mojtaba Mousavi.

Trump must decide by January 12 whether to extend sanctions waivers. “What will happens if President Trump does not waive the sanctions and go out of the deal?” the official asked. “What I can tell you is that we have all received our instructions. The Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) is fully prepared to speed up our nuclear program and we have also our instructions to go and activate the mechanism in the JCPOA to deal with this non-compliance of the deal by the US.” 

Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization chief had earlier warned that the country would reconsider its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if the US fails to implement its commitments as per the nuclear deal between Tehran and world powers.

Speaking in a telephone conversation with IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano on Monday, Ali Akbar Salehi warned about the consequences of Washington’s possible withdrawal from the JCPOA.

Iran Not Convinced Europe Will Take Its Side after US Withdrawal

“It is the time for Trump to re-certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA and extend the waivers. If he refuses to do that, it means the end of JCPOA for the US. But is this the end of the deal for Iran and other parties as well? To be honest, it depends on the Europeans’ reaction,” the senior Iranian official added.
“Europeans must convince Iran that they can deliver on their JCPOA commitments without the US. It’s certainly a very big question. To be frank, however, we are not convinced that Europeans would do that. We are not convinced that Europeans can support their own companies against the US and encourage them to work with Iran in case the US sanctions are back.”

“Europeans have so far failed to convince Iran that they can maintain the deal without the US,” he went on to say.
“Actually Europeans played a very good role in past two or three months to prevent the US Congress from doing anything wrong regarding the JCPOA but I’m not sure they can do the same with President Trump himself.”

It seems that Iranian administration has concluded that the US is determined to exit from the nuclear deal. Iranian political circles are still discussing the best way to react to the failure of the JCPOA and some senior politicians believe that Iran’s reaction should be independent from the EU reaction to the US.

“If the US exit from the deal, Iran must leave the deal. We can’t again rely on the Europeans weak promises, we should put an end to this sequence of damages as soon as US kills the nuclear deal,” says Hossein Lotfi, a conservative political activist.

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In light of US President Donald Trump’s decision to decertify Iran deal caused heated debate inside Iran about the Trump’s plan for the JCPOA and the best Iranian reaction to US disavowing the nuclear deal. Mojtaba Mousavi tried to discuss the issue with Barbara Slavin, an American expert on Iran and a President Trump critic who believes that the new US president is not a rational player. 

Barbara Slavin is an American journalist and foreign policy expert. She is a Washington correspondent for Al Monitor and acting director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. She is the author of a book about Iran–United States relations.

This interview originally appeared in the October 16, 2017 edition of Iranian Jamejam daily.

Q: How can Trump prevent the possible tension in US-EU relations while he increases pressure on Iran by introducing new sanctions and threatening to put an end to the nuclear deal?

Slavin: Trump cannot prevent tension in US-EU relations; on the contrary, his “decertification” of the Iran deal and threats to “terminate” the agreement if Congress does not act to address its flaws will increase US-EU tensions to a degree not seen since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Q: You talked about a possible dire US-EU tension. How can such tension influence the Middle East security and the West role in the region?

Slavin: Europeans will be less likely to work with the US on solutions to regional conflicts. This is a big opportunity for Iran to split Europe from the United States.
Q: Would you please elaborate more about the possible tension in US-EU relationship? Which aspects of the EU-US relationship are more vulnerable? Is that possible that such tension evolves into sort of a cold war between the two?

Slavin: I don’t see a ‘Cold War’ between the US and Europe; there are too many long-standing security, economic and people-to-people ties. I think Europeans will do their best to survive Trump and await more traditional and sensible US leadership after he’s gone.

Q: What would be the perfect role Iran can play in the above mentioned scenario?

Slavin: Iran, as I suggested, should avoid Trump’s trap and stay within the JCPOA. It should also work hard on internal reforms and make itself more attractive to foreign — and Iranian — investors by cleaning up corruption and getting rid of burdensome regulations. It should also stop jailing dual nationals on bogus charges as this chills the climate for investment and tourism. Forty years after the revolution, it is time for Iran to stop taking hostages.

Q: How likely is that the Congress would meet Trump’s expectations? How can the Congress (Maybe with the help of other JCPOA parties) address what Trump sees as the deal’s flaws?

Slavin: This is very hard to predict. Congress has struggled to deal with other issues, including health care, and any change in the current law on the Iran deal would require 60 votes in the Senate. Ultimately, this is Trump’s responsibility and he cannot foist it on Congress.
Q: Do you agree that Trump will not push the certain European states (France, Britain and Germany) to end their economic relations with Iran to keep them satisfied while the US is trying to force Iran to budge on non-nuclear issues?

Slavin: Europe is justly proud of its role in initiating negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue – at a time when President Bush would not talk directly with Iran without preconditions. European businesses have just begun to return to Iran and they do not want to jeopardize those contracts.

This will be a real test of the willingness of the international community to stand up to Trump’s intimidation and of the independence of Western businesses. I hope that Iran continues to abide by the agreement and that Europe – and US allies in Asia – also continue to implement the JCPOA.

Q: Part of Iranian establishment believes that JCPOA would be meaningless for Iran if US withdraws or refuse to abide by the agreement. They believe that EU will choose to stand by the US if Trump raise the cost of working with Iran (through financial and banking instruments). A few minutes ago Mr. Zarif told the Iran state TV that “If they revive the sanctions, we will decide whether to continue staying in the JCPOA or terminating it.”
Do you think, the Europeans can economically endure the Trump’s pressure if US withdraws the deal and introduce through penalties for those who do business with Iran?

Slavin: This is the key question – what European businesses do, not what European leaders say. However, I believe that there is so much anger toward Trump in Europe that there is a good chance that European businesses will remain in the Iran market and that they will be defended by their political leadership. There is also no certainty that Congress – or Trump – will re-impose secondary sanctions, no matter what Trump said on Friday.

Q: I see a quote from President Trump in which he says he has talked with Theresa May and Emmanuel Macron about Iran. “Don’t do anything. Don’t worry about it. Take all the money you can get. They’re all friends of mine,” he has said.
Does that mean sort of coordination between Trump and Macron on Iran deal? Many were hopeful that Macron can play a role in containing Trump. Do you see any ground for Macron and Trump to compromise on a modified version of the JCPOA so all parties including Trump’s US can stay in the deal?

Slavin: As for the influence of May and Macron, I would not count on it. Trump loves it when foreign leaders beg him not to do various things and then he goes ahead and does them anyway. He is a cruel person and the most incompetent American president I have seen in my lifetime.

Q: JCPOA is a very important deal and has implications for the international security. From the other point of view, we are witnessing Saudi’s intensified efforts to develop a nuclear program which, given to the Saudi’s aggressive behavior, can increase the regional instability.
How can this deal, if preserved, shape the future power structure of the region and the world? Do you see it necessary for the US to limit Saudi’s ambitious nuclear program?

Slavin: I am not well informed about Saudi Arabia’s nuclear intentions. Frankly, given all the challenges the Saudis face these days, I would not be too concerned about this.
Q: In a piece for National Interest, Joseph Nye wrote that the real challenge that the US is facing could be called “the rise of the rest”. Some authors such as Fareed Zakaria in his “Post-Americanism World” are pointing to the same challenge. In view of such analysis, do you think the US can overcome those challenges stemming from its power and hegemony? Or is it the Trump’s US has no clear awareness of such challenge?

Slavin: Long before Trump, other countries such as China were increasing their economic and geostrategic power. Trump has accelerated this process with his defiance of international treaties and other agreements such as the Paris accords, the Trans Pacific Partnership and now the JCPOA. He is not making America “great again.” He is diminishing our international role and it will take a lot of work by his successors to restore American leadership.

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The statement was read out in a joint press conference in the Swiss city by the EU high representative, Federica Mogherini, and Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on Thursday.

Here is the complete text of the joing statement: 

We, the EU High Representative and the Foreign Minister of the I. R. of Iran, together with the Foreign Ministers of the E3+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States), met from 26 March to 2nd April 2015 in Switzerland. As agreed in November 2013, we gathered here to find solutions towards reaching a comprehensive resolution that will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and the comprehensive lifting of all sanctions.

Today, we have taken a decisive step: we have reached solutions on key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The political determination, the good will and the hard work of all parties made it possible. Let us thank all delegations for their tireless dedication.

This is a crucial decision laying the agreed basis for the final text of the JCPOA. We can now restart drafting the text and annexes of the JCPOA, guided by the solutions developed in these days.


As Iran pursues a peaceful nuclear programme, Iran’s enrichment capacity, enrichment level and stockpile will be limited for specified durations, and there will be no other enrichment facility than Natanz. Iran’s research and development on centrifuges will be carried out on a scope and schedule that has been mutually agreed.

Fordow will be converted from an enrichment site into a nuclear, physics and technology centre. International collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of research. There will not be any fissile material at Fordow. 

An international joint venture will assist Iran in redesigning and rebuilding a modernized Heavy Water Research Reactor in Arak that will not produce weapons grade plutonium. There will be no reprocessing and the spent fuel will be exported.

A set of measures have been agreed to monitor the provisions of the JCPOA including implementation of the modified Code 3.1 and provisional application of the Additional Protocol. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be permitted the use of modern technologies and will have enhanced access through agreed procedures, including to clarify past and present issues.

Iran will take part in international cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy which can include supply of power and research reactors. Another important area of cooperation will be in the field of nuclear safety and security. The EU will terminate the implementation of all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions and the US will cease the application of all nuclear-related secondary economic and financial sanctions, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of its key nuclear commitments.

A new UN Security Council Resolution will endorse the JCPOA, terminate all previous nuclear-related resolutions and incorporate certain restrictive measures for a mutually agreed period of time.

We will now work to write the text of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action including its technical details in the coming weeks and months at the political and experts levels. We are committed to complete our efforts by June 30th. We would like to thank the Swiss government for its generous support in hosting these negotiations.

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Tehran-Moscow relations are poised to enter into a historic phase under the current circumstances and given the two countries’ ups and downs in history.

Throughout the past several months, Iran and Russia have stepped up efforts to deepen their ties. The recent Moscow visit by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, holding the first Iran-Russia strategic relations meeting in Moscow, the Tehran visits of the Russian ministers of defense and energy and, above all, the visit by senior Iranian official Ali Akbar Velayati to submit the message of President Rouhani to Russian President Vladimir Putin are but examples that make the mutual efforts by the two countries to enhance their ties evident.

By sending Velayati, the Supreme Leader’s advisor in international affairs, to Moscow as his special messenger, Rouhani meant to convey to Russians that the Leader has thrown his weight on enhancing ties with Kremlin and that the move enjoys the backing of the Islamic establishment’s highest political decision-makers.

Now the question is: Why should Iran be seeking enhanced ties with Russia?

1. The sitting administration in Iran took office with promises of bolstering foreign relations and international status of the country in a bid to allay the nation’s political and economic concerns. To that effect, Rouhani has spent most of his energy on resolving Iran’s nuclear issue in the talks with the group of P5+1, while the outcome of the talks have disproved being worth his endeavors so far. As the talks drag on and US sticks to its sanctions against Iran, hopes for reaching a final nuclear agreement flare up inside Iran, and the administration has embarked on its Plan B to resolve the nation’s economic problems.

Enhancement of ties with Russia tells the West, especially the US, that the Islamic Republic has a firm Plan B and it would adhere to if the talks fail. It also says that Iran has not limited all its efforts to the future of the talks. “If they [P5+1 negotiators with Iran] fail to make such an agreement, the people of Iran, officials, the honorable administration and others have many different options. They should definitely take these options so that they can counteract and slow the plot of imposing sanctions,” said Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei in speech he delivered on February 8, 2015 in a meeting with commanders and personnel of the Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army.

2. Taking office of a moderate president in Iran has raised hopes for the peaceful resolution of Iran’s nuclear case with the West. This has stoked Kremlin with fears that more pressure will be put on Russia if Iran’s relations with the West normalize. Iran’s decision to raise interactions and enhance ties with Russia can quell its worries in this regard.

3. In its new approach, Iran has tried to exploit Russia’s dispute with the West in the talks. Dr. Velayati said after his meeting with Putin that new Russian stance in the talks should be expected in the talks.

4. There are several areas where the two countries enjoy common grounds like the crises in Syria and Iraq, opposing US monopoly and Iran’s tender to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Tehran-Moscow cooperation can facilitate these areas.

5. Iran and Russia can severely influence the world energy market. As the two countries’ oil revenues have fallen dramatically thanks to the falling oil prices, which they believe is a political plot hatched jointly by the US and its Middle East ally Saudi Arabia, Iran and Russia have been prompted to think out plans to enhance their ties in order to shield their economies against the current and future economic assaults. This was evident when Russian energy minister attended Velayati’s meeting with Putin in Moscow.

All in all, when dealing with Russia, certain points need to be considered:
Iranian decision-makers must be wary of the fact that enhanced relations with Russia must not, under any circumstances, be based on West’s animosity toward the two nations because if this is not the case in the future, Iran will be the side that loses the most. Secondly, Iran must always remember that Kremlin would never prefer Iran over Western allies.

* Soheil Kheiri has an M.A in Eurasian studies from the School of International Relations of the Iranian Foreign Ministry. His articles about the Russian politics are published in the scientific journals and he regularly writes for Iranian newspapers and political magazines.

The post Iran Reaches Out for Russia: Why? first appeared on .

According to the informed sources talked to Iran’sView, the new Iranian President, Hassan Rowhani, perceived to have won the June-14 elections by his moderation promises, is said to have requested the Leader to give him a modest free hand in the country’s foreign policy affairs, including the prolonged nuclear standoff, so that he will be able to tackle the Islamic Republic’s economic problems to some extent.

It is years now that Tehran is at odds with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) over its nuclear case due to irreconcilable views of the negotiating sides.

According to a Rouhani aide who has spoke to Iran’sView on condition of anonymity, he has promised the Supreme Leader he will be able to scrape a large part of the stifling sanctions imposed on Iran without damaging the nature of its nuclear program provided that the Leader permits the president to act more flexibly in the talks with the P5+1.

“I would agree with what I once called ‘heroic flexibility’, as it is a proper move at times,” said the Leader during his address to the Sepah commanders on Tuesday, seems to be an explicitly agreeing to the administration’s request. However, he cautioned the president to be wary of the “other side and the chief objective” in the talks while being more flexible.

Though this was not the first time the Supreme Leader spoke of “heroic flexibility”.

“Artistic and heroic flexibility, softness and maneuver are accepted and welcome in all political grounds,” said the Leader in another meeting a fortnight ago with members of the Assembly of Experts. “But maneuvers should not be interpreted as a leave to cross the red lines or step back of fundamental strategies or neglecting the ideals.”

The Leader of Iran is still suspicious about the flexibility in international dealings of the new administration as it might be induced to cross some red lines (like direct and comprehensive talks with the US) or retreat from fundamental strategies of the Islamic Republic (like supporting Palestinian cause and the Syrian government as part of the resistance front).

The Leader once again reminded the administration in his Tuesday speech that it is not allowed to neglect the “objectives and ideals” of the Islamic Revolution with excuses like “The world or the trends has changed.”

According to political observers in Tehran, the Supreme Leader has allowed the administration to expand ties with European countries, engage in direct talks with the US over the Syrian conflict, and show more flexibility in nuclear talks. The Leader has decided to let Rouhani have his try in various fields, even though he (the Leader) is not optimistic about the West’s reaction to Iran’s flexible tone; which is why the Leader stressed in his Tuesday speech that the US and the West are seeking much greatest goals in Iran’s nuclear case and that it should be taken in and well analyzed by “challenging the hegemonic system by the Islamic Revolution”.

“We do not approve of nuclear weapons not because of the US or others, but because of our beliefs; when we say no one can have nuclear weapons, we would never seek such weapons ourselves; the dissenters of Iran are after something else. These countries would never let their nuclear energy monopoly be broken,” Ayatollah Khamenei said on Tuesday.

“Diplomacy is the field of smile and calls for talks and negotiations; however, all these should be defined in the framework of our major challenge.”

Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly cautioned the new administration against the Islamic Republic’s red lines and fundamentals while exhibiting flexibility in its foreign dealings. In his earlier speech addressing members of the Assembly of Experts, the Leader certified that every “administration or person has their own methods and innovations, and are allowed to practice them in their work.”

As a key player in Iran’s power struggle during the past 34 years, the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, or Sepah, has aligned itself well with the Supreme Leader’s directions, and stood up to administrations which fail to follow the Leader’s directions. Besides, the construction projects as well as economic activities run by the Sepah are a powerful lever that can help every administration to materialize their domestic policies; which may be why the President Rowhani addressed Sepah commanders a day before the Leader to ask them to support the administration economically.

With regard to Rowhani’s concerns about acceptance of his “flexible” policies by Sepah commanders, the Supreme Leader called on Sepah top brass to temporarily step out of politics and view the developments from outside.

“Sepah is not required to meddle in political grounds, but guardianship of the Revolution needs precise understanding of realities,” the Leader said on Tuesday.

“The organization that is deemed as the Revolution’s guardian arm cannot be expected to be alien to derivative political currents,” said the Leader, stressing that under the current circumstances Sepah must, of course, identify and counter all adversaries of the Islamic Republic.

The Leader is evidently giving the administration a free hand to remedy the country’s economic and political headache by putting into effect its innovations. Likewise the Leader would be happy see that his strategic decision has helped the administration manage to fulfill its promises and receive a palatable feedback from foreigners. However, if the government fails to get the desired response from the West by being more flexible, just like the Reformist administration of Mohammad Khatami, the Leader’s warnings and pessimism against the US and enemies will be well substantiated. 

“The revolution’s future is glorious for sure, but the time of its happening depends of the performance of the nation and officials. If we are united, integrated and decisive, such a future is soon realized, but if we are infested with indolence, arrogance and other such stuff, that future will be late to come.” Ayatollah Khamenei said to the top commanders of Sepah.

The post REPEAT:: Why Iran’s Leader Gives Rowhani Nuclear Free Hand? first appeared on .

While Iran and the five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany are to start drafting the text of a comprehensive nuclear agreement on May 13, Ayatollah Khamenei said that the West’s expectation of limiting Iran’s missile program is foolish.

While the P5+1, led by the United States, has insisted that Iran’s ballistic missile program will be on the table in any comprehensive agreement, Iran repeatedly rejected any issue other than the nuclear program should be part of the negotiations.

“I always supported creativity in the foreign policy and the negotiations and always advise officials to apply utmost creativity in the international interactions. But the country’s needs and issues like sanctions should not be tied to the negotiations. The authorities should resolve the sanctions in a different way,” Iran’s Leader said today.

Iran and the P5+1 reached a landmark nuclear interim deal in Geneva on November 24, 2013 in which Iran agreed to dilute some of its 20% enriched uranium stockpile to a lower concentration and convert some into oxide.

Although the agreement came into force on January 20 but Iranian officials believes US failed to meet its commitments to easing of sanctions.

“[The West] expect to limit Iran’s missile program while they are threatening Iran with military action. Such expectations are foolish and idiotic.”
Iran’s IRGC displayed its latest aerospace achievements which include modern designation of ballistic missile systems and production of advanced drones.

During his two-hour visit from the IRGC exhibition, Ayatollah Khamenei also watched a recorded video of Iranian drones filming USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier. he then went to visited a captured American RQ-170 sentinel drone and its Iranian version that was manufactured by IRGC Aerospace Force through reverse engineering.

On 4 December 2011, an American Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was captured by Iranian forces near the city of Kashmar in northeastern Iran.

The Iranian government announced that the UAV was brought down by its cyberwarfare unit which commandeered the aircraft and safely landed it, after initial reports from Western news sources inaccurately claimed that it had been “shot down”. The United States government initially denied the claims but later President Obama acknowledged that the downed aircraft was a US drone and requested Iran to return it.

But Obama’s request rejected one day later by Iranian officials which urged US to apologize to the Iranian nation because of violating the country’s aerospace.

Below are Photos of Iran’s Leader visiting Aerospace Force of the IRGC exhibition:

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During the interview, Abbasi argued that Stuxnet malware was not the first and last of such attacks by the US and Israel against Tehran’s nuclear program and said they have repeatedly infiltrated Iranian nuclear facilities’ supply chains in recent years.

Abbasi maintained that western espionage agencies also continuously use the IAEA reports about Iran’s nuclear activities and glean details about the program in a bid to sabotage its progress.

“The IAEA has access to all the details about uranium enrichment processes in Iran,” said Abbasi.

“We have so far arrived at the conclusion that western intelligence agencies calibrate their moves based on the leaked IAEA reports and only by the reports they are able to size up the level of destruction they have exerted on our nuclear machinery and equipment.

For example, the IAEA constantly requires Iran to provide the agency with the updated Design Information Questioner (DIQ) in which Tehran gives out data about the design and progress of its nuclear facilities. The DIQ also carried intelligence such as the pieces Iran needs to progress its projects in the facilities. On the other hand, intelligence agencies, with access to the IAEA reports, trace companies that produce such pieces as mentioned in the DIQ, put them under pressure to reject Iran’s bids for the purchase of the pieces or make them booby-trap the devices, use malfunctioning materials in their construction and set up viruses in their control systems.”

The Stuxnet virus was one of the most destructive attacks carried by the US and Israel against Iran’s nuclear program. A while ago,
Christian Science Monitor released an article about the virus which uncovered new details about its infiltration method into Iran’s Natanz nuclear fuel-enrichment facility.

The article well supports Professor Abbasi’s assertions about the virus and adds that there is sufficient evidence that western intelligence agencies tampered with the devices and booby-trapped them where possible.

“Spy agencies adjust their attacks based on our needs; they obstruct conventional channels to our purchases and leave open only those that they can exert full control over to transfer their modified stuff to our facilities. This is how they penetrated our electronic infrastructures, bugged on us and installed malwares like the Stuxnet. They set up the virus in the gauges we had purchased from Siemens and also putted explosives in the devices,” Abbasi revealed for first time. 

The former IAEO chief also believes that Siemens is influenced by American and Israeli spy agencies and was involved with installation of the Stuxnet. He also underlined that the German Siemens and the British Edwards have remained in close contacts with espionage agencies.

As Abbasi noted, the West’s anti-Iran plots are wide-ranging and go much beyond Stuxnet; the original material used for making diaphragms in the imported vacuum valves were replaced with stuff that would easily wear off when faced with UF6 gas.

“They also manipulated  some electro motors we bought and added some specific boards which were covered by resin. 60 of such manipulated electro motors were sold to us. Another example I can say is the valve pupms that we wanted to buy from AEG but the intelligence services intercepted the shipment of those pumps and manipulated them.”

The large number of cyber attacks as well as technical mischief by the West compels Iran to act more warily when providing details for the IAEA through the DIQs.

“By accessing the leaked data from our reports they can tell how many centrifuges are operating in Iranian nuclear facilities and how many are about to be installed with what parts needed. Therefore, we shall prevent giving such data to the agency or delay the DIQs at least until the projects are fulfilled.”

 Concerns Over Israeli – American Military Action

Abbasi also said that the Islamic Republic of Iran was concerned about a military operation by the US and Israel against its nuclear facilities based on the data Iran provides the agency with. This is why updates about new construction projects like Arak heavy-water reactor were given to the agency only after the project was surreptitiously completed.

” We had to keep it to ourselves when we intended to replace the Arak reactor vessel because it could spur westerners into reactions like making threats or assassination attempts of Iranian scientists.”

So Iran concealed the reactor vessel for a few years till the replacement operation was done.

Former head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization says the country had received information that there was possibility of hitting the reactor vessel by Stinger missiles.

“Deformation of the reactor vessel could make it nonstandard and the IAEA would not approve the use of it. So we tried to hide our workhouse from the enemies’ sight,” he said. 

Threatening and sabotage against Iran’s nuclear program were not limited to military action or manipupalting the components but US and Israel also tried to threaten or murder the scientists and Iran’s nuclear program brains to stop the progress of the program.

From 2010 through 2012, five key Iranian nuclear scientists were murdered. Iran has vehemently condemned the Zionist regime for the terrors while the regime has never even bothered to deny the allegations.

Araqchi, a senior member of the Iranian team of negotiators in the talks with the group of P5+1, also complained in 2012  that the IAEA’s careless handling of Iran’s secret information has caused a leak in the list of the names of Iran’s nuclear scientists and their
assassination by the Zionist regime of Israel.

Iran’s Intelligence Ministry also detected some of Mossad’s bases within the territories of one of Iran’s Western neighbors, which
provided training and logistic support to the terrorist networks.

Although Mossad has not been able to carry out its assassination attempts given the rise of security measures by Iran for its nuclear scientists, the agency still threatens to put dangers to the families of the scientists and themselves.

“They once ordered a florist to set up a bouquet with a card which carried condolences to the family of an Iranian nuclear engineer to his family outside of the Iran. The bouquet reached the engineer’s family while he was safe and sound working in one of the facilities in Iran. By such moves the mar the conditions with threats and insecurity,” Abbasi said.

“They also have access to names and contact numbers of key personnel which can be used as means for obtaining further intelligence about individuals leading to their terror and assassination. They have even faked pictures of Iranian scientists murdered being shown on Iranian national TV and sent the video to the scientists as a death warning.”

The post How West Infiltrated Iran’s Nuclear Program, Ex-Top Nuclear Official Explains first appeared on .

However, above all dissatisfactions of the plan exerted by various concerning groups in Iran is the Rouhani administration’s failure to convince the leadership that the deal was a success for Tehran, the new US sanctions against the country have been intensified in the months that followed the deal and the US officials tend to use threatening rhetoric when dealing with Iran. Prior to the Geneva talks, the negotiating team, and of course Rouhan, enjoyed the Supreme Leader’s full support when he described them as ‘sons of the Revolution’.

A day before the talks in Vienna begun, the Leader, addressing large mass of Iranians, openly talked about his discord with the negotiation’s process.

“Some of the officials from of the previous and current administration believe that we have to talk to the US to resolve the nuclear issue,” he said. “Ok, then. We said go ahead and talk to them about this specific topic, but I said in my speech at the beginning of the current Iranian calendar year that I would not disagree with such talks while I am not optimistic about its outcome. Now, look at their ludicrous remarks [against Iran],” Ayatollah Khamenei said.

The Leader’s remarks came following his prolonged discussions with the Rouhani administration and the nuclear team about Iran’s promises in the Geneva deal which limited a vast part of its nuclear activities. The promises are believed to be detrimental to the progress of Iran’s nuclear program; however, the Leader insists that Tehran should be committed to them because he knows that failing to observe them would make things even worse for Iran.

“What the Foreign Ministry has started will be continued, Iran will not violate its commitments but I am saying now it will not get anywhere,” he said on Monday.

Anyway it seems that Foreign Minister Zarif accepted some of the criticism and is willing to try to satisfy some of them in the Vienna talks. 

Iran’s Leader favors a resolution at the end of the talks which allows Iran to pursue an industrial enrichment program. Moreover, the exact number of active centrifuges and the fate of Arak Heavy-water facilities should also be discussed in the talks.

The fact is that most of the critics of the Geneva deal in Tehran maintain that the Iranian negotiating team has missed many privileges in the talks so far like 20% enrichment and annihilation of the reserves. Policy makers in Tehran believe that that a proper final agreement should contain transparency procedures rather than mechanisms to confine its progress. The agreement should also link and unify Iran’s talks with the IAEA with the P5+1.

Negotiation in Vienna are more difficult for Mohammad-Javad Zarif and his team who are trying to prove their ability to acquire not a deal but a “good deal” that can be sold at home. They may believe that the Iran’s leader’s New Year Speech, less than two month later, maybe kind of ultimatum for them.

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following is the full text of the plan:

Joint Plan of Action

Preamble

The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by-step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme.

There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including,among other things, addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Council’s consideration of this matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.

Elements of a first step

The first step would be time-bound, with a duration of 6 months, and renewable by mutual consent, during which all parties will work to maintain a constructive atmosphere for negotiations in good faith.

Iran would undertake the following voluntary measures:

     •    From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide
          for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%.
          No reconversion line.

     •    Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.

     •     Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel
           Enrichment Plant1, Fordow2 , or the Arak reactor3 , designated by the IAEA as IR-40.

     •     Beginning when the line for conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% to UO2 is ready, Iran
           has decided to convert to oxide UF6 newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period,
           as provided in the operational schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA.

     •     No new locations for the enrichment.

     •     Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its current enrichment R&D
           practices, which are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.

     •     No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.

     •     Enhanced monitoring:

                o  Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iran’s plans
                     for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a
                     description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in specified
                     nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on
                     source material. This information would be provided within three months of the
                     adoption of these measures.

                o  Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as
                     the IR-40, to the IAEA.

                o  Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the
                     reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.

                o  Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of
                     Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical
                     Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to
                     offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.

                o  IAEA inspector managed access to:
                                centrifuge assembly workshops4;

                                centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and,

                                uranium mines and mills.

                                                           
1 Namely, during the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF6 into the centrifuges installed but not enriching uranium. Not install additional centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.
2  At Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not increase enrichment capacity. Not feed UF6 into the other 12 cascades, which would remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections between cascades.
Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.
3 Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the reactor or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor or install remaining components. 
4 Consistent with its plans, Iran’s centrifuge production during the 6 months will be dedicated to replace damaged machines. 

                                                                                                                                    2 

  In return, the E3/EU+3 would undertake the following voluntary measures:

      •    Pause efforts to further reduce Iran’s crude oil sales, enabling Iran’s current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services.

      •    Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on:

                 o Iran’s petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services5.

                 o Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services.

      •    Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran’s auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated  services.

      •    License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil
           aviation and associated services. License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran as well
           as associated services6.

      •   No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions.

      •   No new EU nuclear-related sanctions.

      •    The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the
           Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.

      •    Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran’s domestic needs using
           Iranian oil revenues held abroad. Humanitarian trade would be defined as transactions
           involving food and agricultural products, medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses
           incurred abroad. This channel would involve specified foreign banks and non-designated
           Iranian banks to be defined when establishing the channel.
                 o This channel could also enable:
                             transactions required to pay Iran’s UN obligations; and,
                             direct tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students
                                studying abroad, up to an agreed amount for the six month period.

      •    Increase the EU authorisation thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed
           amount.

                                                           
5 “Sanctions on associated services” means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to   the underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities.
6 Sanctions relief could involve any non-designated Iranian airlines as well as Iran Air.

                                                                                                                                  3 

  Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution*

The final step of a comprehensive solution, which the parties aim to conclude negotiating and commence implementing no more than one year after the adoption of this document, would:

          •    Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.

          •    Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards
               Agreements.

          •    Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear-related
               sanctions, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy, on
               a schedule to be agreed upon.

          •    Involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters
               consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment
               activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to
               be agreed upon.

          •    Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.
               No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.

          •    Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring. Ratify and
               implement the Additional Protocol, consistent with the respective roles of the President
               and the Majlis (Iranian parliament).

          •    Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others, on acquiring
               modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, and the supply
               of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed R&D practices.

Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

* With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the standard principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” applies.

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