The statement was read out in a joint press conference in the Swiss city by the EU high representative, Federica Mogherini, and Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on Thursday.

Here is the complete text of the joing statement: 

We, the EU High Representative and the Foreign Minister of the I. R. of Iran, together with the Foreign Ministers of the E3+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States), met from 26 March to 2nd April 2015 in Switzerland. As agreed in November 2013, we gathered here to find solutions towards reaching a comprehensive resolution that will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and the comprehensive lifting of all sanctions.

Today, we have taken a decisive step: we have reached solutions on key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The political determination, the good will and the hard work of all parties made it possible. Let us thank all delegations for their tireless dedication.

This is a crucial decision laying the agreed basis for the final text of the JCPOA. We can now restart drafting the text and annexes of the JCPOA, guided by the solutions developed in these days.


As Iran pursues a peaceful nuclear programme, Iran’s enrichment capacity, enrichment level and stockpile will be limited for specified durations, and there will be no other enrichment facility than Natanz. Iran’s research and development on centrifuges will be carried out on a scope and schedule that has been mutually agreed.

Fordow will be converted from an enrichment site into a nuclear, physics and technology centre. International collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of research. There will not be any fissile material at Fordow. 

An international joint venture will assist Iran in redesigning and rebuilding a modernized Heavy Water Research Reactor in Arak that will not produce weapons grade plutonium. There will be no reprocessing and the spent fuel will be exported.

A set of measures have been agreed to monitor the provisions of the JCPOA including implementation of the modified Code 3.1 and provisional application of the Additional Protocol. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be permitted the use of modern technologies and will have enhanced access through agreed procedures, including to clarify past and present issues.

Iran will take part in international cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy which can include supply of power and research reactors. Another important area of cooperation will be in the field of nuclear safety and security. The EU will terminate the implementation of all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions and the US will cease the application of all nuclear-related secondary economic and financial sanctions, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of its key nuclear commitments.

A new UN Security Council Resolution will endorse the JCPOA, terminate all previous nuclear-related resolutions and incorporate certain restrictive measures for a mutually agreed period of time.

We will now work to write the text of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action including its technical details in the coming weeks and months at the political and experts levels. We are committed to complete our efforts by June 30th. We would like to thank the Swiss government for its generous support in hosting these negotiations.

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Tehran-Moscow relations are poised to enter into a historic phase under the current circumstances and given the two countries’ ups and downs in history.

Throughout the past several months, Iran and Russia have stepped up efforts to deepen their ties. The recent Moscow visit by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, holding the first Iran-Russia strategic relations meeting in Moscow, the Tehran visits of the Russian ministers of defense and energy and, above all, the visit by senior Iranian official Ali Akbar Velayati to submit the message of President Rouhani to Russian President Vladimir Putin are but examples that make the mutual efforts by the two countries to enhance their ties evident.

By sending Velayati, the Supreme Leader’s advisor in international affairs, to Moscow as his special messenger, Rouhani meant to convey to Russians that the Leader has thrown his weight on enhancing ties with Kremlin and that the move enjoys the backing of the Islamic establishment’s highest political decision-makers.

Now the question is: Why should Iran be seeking enhanced ties with Russia?

1. The sitting administration in Iran took office with promises of bolstering foreign relations and international status of the country in a bid to allay the nation’s political and economic concerns. To that effect, Rouhani has spent most of his energy on resolving Iran’s nuclear issue in the talks with the group of P5+1, while the outcome of the talks have disproved being worth his endeavors so far. As the talks drag on and US sticks to its sanctions against Iran, hopes for reaching a final nuclear agreement flare up inside Iran, and the administration has embarked on its Plan B to resolve the nation’s economic problems.

Enhancement of ties with Russia tells the West, especially the US, that the Islamic Republic has a firm Plan B and it would adhere to if the talks fail. It also says that Iran has not limited all its efforts to the future of the talks. “If they [P5+1 negotiators with Iran] fail to make such an agreement, the people of Iran, officials, the honorable administration and others have many different options. They should definitely take these options so that they can counteract and slow the plot of imposing sanctions,” said Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei in speech he delivered on February 8, 2015 in a meeting with commanders and personnel of the Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army.

2. Taking office of a moderate president in Iran has raised hopes for the peaceful resolution of Iran’s nuclear case with the West. This has stoked Kremlin with fears that more pressure will be put on Russia if Iran’s relations with the West normalize. Iran’s decision to raise interactions and enhance ties with Russia can quell its worries in this regard.

3. In its new approach, Iran has tried to exploit Russia’s dispute with the West in the talks. Dr. Velayati said after his meeting with Putin that new Russian stance in the talks should be expected in the talks.

4. There are several areas where the two countries enjoy common grounds like the crises in Syria and Iraq, opposing US monopoly and Iran’s tender to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Tehran-Moscow cooperation can facilitate these areas.

5. Iran and Russia can severely influence the world energy market. As the two countries’ oil revenues have fallen dramatically thanks to the falling oil prices, which they believe is a political plot hatched jointly by the US and its Middle East ally Saudi Arabia, Iran and Russia have been prompted to think out plans to enhance their ties in order to shield their economies against the current and future economic assaults. This was evident when Russian energy minister attended Velayati’s meeting with Putin in Moscow.

All in all, when dealing with Russia, certain points need to be considered:
Iranian decision-makers must be wary of the fact that enhanced relations with Russia must not, under any circumstances, be based on West’s animosity toward the two nations because if this is not the case in the future, Iran will be the side that loses the most. Secondly, Iran must always remember that Kremlin would never prefer Iran over Western allies.

* Soheil Kheiri has an M.A in Eurasian studies from the School of International Relations of the Iranian Foreign Ministry. His articles about the Russian politics are published in the scientific journals and he regularly writes for Iranian newspapers and political magazines.

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During the interview, Abbasi argued that Stuxnet malware was not the first and last of such attacks by the US and Israel against Tehran’s nuclear program and said they have repeatedly infiltrated Iranian nuclear facilities’ supply chains in recent years.

Abbasi maintained that western espionage agencies also continuously use the IAEA reports about Iran’s nuclear activities and glean details about the program in a bid to sabotage its progress.

“The IAEA has access to all the details about uranium enrichment processes in Iran,” said Abbasi.

“We have so far arrived at the conclusion that western intelligence agencies calibrate their moves based on the leaked IAEA reports and only by the reports they are able to size up the level of destruction they have exerted on our nuclear machinery and equipment.

For example, the IAEA constantly requires Iran to provide the agency with the updated Design Information Questioner (DIQ) in which Tehran gives out data about the design and progress of its nuclear facilities. The DIQ also carried intelligence such as the pieces Iran needs to progress its projects in the facilities. On the other hand, intelligence agencies, with access to the IAEA reports, trace companies that produce such pieces as mentioned in the DIQ, put them under pressure to reject Iran’s bids for the purchase of the pieces or make them booby-trap the devices, use malfunctioning materials in their construction and set up viruses in their control systems.”

The Stuxnet virus was one of the most destructive attacks carried by the US and Israel against Iran’s nuclear program. A while ago,
Christian Science Monitor released an article about the virus which uncovered new details about its infiltration method into Iran’s Natanz nuclear fuel-enrichment facility.

The article well supports Professor Abbasi’s assertions about the virus and adds that there is sufficient evidence that western intelligence agencies tampered with the devices and booby-trapped them where possible.

“Spy agencies adjust their attacks based on our needs; they obstruct conventional channels to our purchases and leave open only those that they can exert full control over to transfer their modified stuff to our facilities. This is how they penetrated our electronic infrastructures, bugged on us and installed malwares like the Stuxnet. They set up the virus in the gauges we had purchased from Siemens and also putted explosives in the devices,” Abbasi revealed for first time. 

The former IAEO chief also believes that Siemens is influenced by American and Israeli spy agencies and was involved with installation of the Stuxnet. He also underlined that the German Siemens and the British Edwards have remained in close contacts with espionage agencies.

As Abbasi noted, the West’s anti-Iran plots are wide-ranging and go much beyond Stuxnet; the original material used for making diaphragms in the imported vacuum valves were replaced with stuff that would easily wear off when faced with UF6 gas.

“They also manipulated  some electro motors we bought and added some specific boards which were covered by resin. 60 of such manipulated electro motors were sold to us. Another example I can say is the valve pupms that we wanted to buy from AEG but the intelligence services intercepted the shipment of those pumps and manipulated them.”

The large number of cyber attacks as well as technical mischief by the West compels Iran to act more warily when providing details for the IAEA through the DIQs.

“By accessing the leaked data from our reports they can tell how many centrifuges are operating in Iranian nuclear facilities and how many are about to be installed with what parts needed. Therefore, we shall prevent giving such data to the agency or delay the DIQs at least until the projects are fulfilled.”

 Concerns Over Israeli – American Military Action

Abbasi also said that the Islamic Republic of Iran was concerned about a military operation by the US and Israel against its nuclear facilities based on the data Iran provides the agency with. This is why updates about new construction projects like Arak heavy-water reactor were given to the agency only after the project was surreptitiously completed.

” We had to keep it to ourselves when we intended to replace the Arak reactor vessel because it could spur westerners into reactions like making threats or assassination attempts of Iranian scientists.”

So Iran concealed the reactor vessel for a few years till the replacement operation was done.

Former head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization says the country had received information that there was possibility of hitting the reactor vessel by Stinger missiles.

“Deformation of the reactor vessel could make it nonstandard and the IAEA would not approve the use of it. So we tried to hide our workhouse from the enemies’ sight,” he said. 

Threatening and sabotage against Iran’s nuclear program were not limited to military action or manipupalting the components but US and Israel also tried to threaten or murder the scientists and Iran’s nuclear program brains to stop the progress of the program.

From 2010 through 2012, five key Iranian nuclear scientists were murdered. Iran has vehemently condemned the Zionist regime for the terrors while the regime has never even bothered to deny the allegations.

Araqchi, a senior member of the Iranian team of negotiators in the talks with the group of P5+1, also complained in 2012  that the IAEA’s careless handling of Iran’s secret information has caused a leak in the list of the names of Iran’s nuclear scientists and their
assassination by the Zionist regime of Israel.

Iran’s Intelligence Ministry also detected some of Mossad’s bases within the territories of one of Iran’s Western neighbors, which
provided training and logistic support to the terrorist networks.

Although Mossad has not been able to carry out its assassination attempts given the rise of security measures by Iran for its nuclear scientists, the agency still threatens to put dangers to the families of the scientists and themselves.

“They once ordered a florist to set up a bouquet with a card which carried condolences to the family of an Iranian nuclear engineer to his family outside of the Iran. The bouquet reached the engineer’s family while he was safe and sound working in one of the facilities in Iran. By such moves the mar the conditions with threats and insecurity,” Abbasi said.

“They also have access to names and contact numbers of key personnel which can be used as means for obtaining further intelligence about individuals leading to their terror and assassination. They have even faked pictures of Iranian scientists murdered being shown on Iranian national TV and sent the video to the scientists as a death warning.”

The post How West Infiltrated Iran’s Nuclear Program, Ex-Top Nuclear Official Explains first appeared on .

following is the full text of the plan:

Joint Plan of Action

Preamble

The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by-step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme.

There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including,among other things, addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Council’s consideration of this matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.

Elements of a first step

The first step would be time-bound, with a duration of 6 months, and renewable by mutual consent, during which all parties will work to maintain a constructive atmosphere for negotiations in good faith.

Iran would undertake the following voluntary measures:

     •    From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide
          for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%.
          No reconversion line.

     •    Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.

     •     Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel
           Enrichment Plant1, Fordow2 , or the Arak reactor3 , designated by the IAEA as IR-40.

     •     Beginning when the line for conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% to UO2 is ready, Iran
           has decided to convert to oxide UF6 newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period,
           as provided in the operational schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA.

     •     No new locations for the enrichment.

     •     Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its current enrichment R&D
           practices, which are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.

     •     No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.

     •     Enhanced monitoring:

                o  Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iran’s plans
                     for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a
                     description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in specified
                     nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on
                     source material. This information would be provided within three months of the
                     adoption of these measures.

                o  Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as
                     the IR-40, to the IAEA.

                o  Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the
                     reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.

                o  Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of
                     Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical
                     Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to
                     offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.

                o  IAEA inspector managed access to:
                                centrifuge assembly workshops4;

                                centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and,

                                uranium mines and mills.

                                                           
1 Namely, during the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF6 into the centrifuges installed but not enriching uranium. Not install additional centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.
2  At Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not increase enrichment capacity. Not feed UF6 into the other 12 cascades, which would remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections between cascades.
Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.
3 Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the reactor or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor or install remaining components. 
4 Consistent with its plans, Iran’s centrifuge production during the 6 months will be dedicated to replace damaged machines. 

                                                                                                                                    2 

  In return, the E3/EU+3 would undertake the following voluntary measures:

      •    Pause efforts to further reduce Iran’s crude oil sales, enabling Iran’s current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services.

      •    Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on:

                 o Iran’s petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services5.

                 o Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services.

      •    Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran’s auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated  services.

      •    License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil
           aviation and associated services. License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran as well
           as associated services6.

      •   No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions.

      •   No new EU nuclear-related sanctions.

      •    The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the
           Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.

      •    Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran’s domestic needs using
           Iranian oil revenues held abroad. Humanitarian trade would be defined as transactions
           involving food and agricultural products, medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses
           incurred abroad. This channel would involve specified foreign banks and non-designated
           Iranian banks to be defined when establishing the channel.
                 o This channel could also enable:
                             transactions required to pay Iran’s UN obligations; and,
                             direct tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students
                                studying abroad, up to an agreed amount for the six month period.

      •    Increase the EU authorisation thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed
           amount.

                                                           
5 “Sanctions on associated services” means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to   the underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities.
6 Sanctions relief could involve any non-designated Iranian airlines as well as Iran Air.

                                                                                                                                  3 

  Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution*

The final step of a comprehensive solution, which the parties aim to conclude negotiating and commence implementing no more than one year after the adoption of this document, would:

          •    Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.

          •    Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards
               Agreements.

          •    Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear-related
               sanctions, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy, on
               a schedule to be agreed upon.

          •    Involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters
               consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment
               activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to
               be agreed upon.

          •    Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.
               No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.

          •    Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring. Ratify and
               implement the Additional Protocol, consistent with the respective roles of the President
               and the Majlis (Iranian parliament).

          •    Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others, on acquiring
               modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, and the supply
               of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed R&D practices.

Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

* With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the standard principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” applies.

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The Leader voiced his strong support for the ongoing initiative of the current administration to engage in the talks with the West, including the US, to address Tehran’s nuclear impasse, and censured certain political parties who frowned upon the government’s diplomacy towards the West by installing derogatory banners and essays in the press.

Some of the banners showed the English-language slogan “The U.S. Government Styles Honesty,” and depicted a goateed Iranian official (presumably meant to resemble Zarif) sitting across from a U.S. counterpart who, under the table, conceals symbols of perceived American aggression.

The Leader of the Islamic Revolution advised the current administration against relying on the talks for resolving domestic issues. “We believe that officials should lean on domestic potentials to solve the matters. Successful countries in foreign diplomacy are those who place reliance on their domestic power.”

“We shall not trust a smiling foe. The Americans give us a venal smile at the negotiating table expressing tendency for talks, but at the very same time repeat that they have all the options on the table; what on earth may they do then?” the Leader went on to say.

Americans are most considerate when it comes to Zionists; but “we are free of such considerations. Since its incipience, we have regarded this regime as an illegitimate and bastard establishment.”

He underlined that talks with the US would only concern the nuclear issue, and posited, “Talks with the P5+1 group concern only the nuclear issue and nothing else.”

Referring to his New Year speech in the holy city of Mashhad, he said  that “as I have previously said I am not optimistic about the talks, though, God willing, the negotiations would not harm us.”

“By the talks the Iranian nation would enter into a superior intellectual phase,” Ayatollah Khamenei said.

“If the talks are successful, so much the better. But if they fail, the country shall stand on its own feet afterwards,” the Leader said confirming a previous speculation by Iran’sView.

Ayatollah Khamenei mentioned the nuclear issue of Iran with the West as well, and said, “Iran’s voluntary suspension of its enrichment program for two years in 2004 delayed the country at least two years in its nuclear agenda; however, it finally turned out to be our benefit… during the two years that Iran volunteered to suspend (uranium) enrichment, the West showed no sign of building confidence and easing sanctions against Tehran, so that the Leader mandated the then-administration to restore nuclear activities. Iran regards the 2004 failure as an instance for not trusting the West.”

The post Iran’s Leader Frowns at Hardliners, Pats Nuclear Negotiators first appeared on .

Today, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif, who is in charge of the nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 since the moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani took the office in the June 14 presidential election, presented a new proposal from Iran during the 1st round of talks and left his deputy Abbas Araghchi in room to lead the Iranian negotiating team.

Iranian diplomats also began lobbying to the P5+1 few days before the talks when Morteza Sarmadi another deputy of the Iranian foreign minister visited Beijing on the eve of the nuclear talks.

Abbas Araqchi also had a meeting with his Russian counterpart Sergei Ryabcov on the sidelines of the plenary meeting on Tuesday morning.

Russia and China, as two members of the P5+1 play a key role in balancing the group’s stance towards Iran.

During the talks, having been previously headed by hardliner Saeed Jalili, Iran and the P5+1 failed to reach a consensus even on what topics they should focus on.

Political observers in Tehran maintain that one of the most important obstacles in the former rounds of talks was that the two sides did not have a common objective and the talk sessions proceeded with unrelated, disorderly discussions.

Tehran and the P5+1 members have agreed to keep Iran’s new nuclear proposal which is titled as “An end to a unnecessary crisis, a beginning to a new horizons”  as confidential. Iran also kept its Baghdad proposal presented last year to the P5+1 confidential until the group rejected that months later in Almaty.

Iranian diplomat described the major steps Iran has assumed for reaching an agreement with the other side of the talks were said this morning through a Powerpoint presentation by Zarif.  The steps can be summarized  as being:

– Accepting Iran’s nuclear right for developing, investigating, producing and using nuclear energy;

– Employing truth-finding strategies;

– International cooperation for fulfillment of Iran’s rights;

– Halting all the sanctions imposed on Iran; and

– Cooperation in common interests and concerns.

Both sides of the talks are sending positive signals about the nature of today’s negotiations. But the most important change we are witnessing is the realistic viewpoint of the parties and expectations is balanced as we hear from the early statements of the officials.

 “We will try to reach preliminary results by tomorrow morning, but anyway we do not expect to reach a final solution by tomorrow,” said Abbas Araghchi while briefing Iranian media after the end of first plenary today morning.

He also expressed hope for next round of talks to take place less than one month later.

The post Iran’s 5-Step Geneva Package:Realistic, Promising first appeared on .

According to the informed sources talked to Iran’sView, the new Iranian President, Hassan Rowhani, perceived to have won the June-14 elections by his moderation promises, is said to have requested the Leader to give him a modest free hand in the country’s foreign policy affairs, including the prolonged nuclear standoff, so that he will be able to tackle the Islamic Republic’s economic problems to some extent.

It is years now that Tehran is at odds with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) over its nuclear case due to irreconcilable views of the negotiating sides.

According to a Rouhani aide who has spoke to Iran’sView on condition of anonymity, he has promised the Supreme Leader he will be able to scrape a large part of the stifling sanctions imposed on Iran without damaging the nature of its nuclear program provided that the Leader permits the president to act more flexibly in the talks with the P5+1.

“I would agree with what I once called ‘heroic flexibility’, as it is a proper move at times,” said the Leader during his address to the Sepah commanders on Tuesday, seems to be an explicitly agreeing to the administration’s request. However, he cautioned the president to be wary of the “other side and the chief objective” in the talks while being more flexible.

Though this was not the first time the Supreme Leader spoke of “heroic flexibility”.

“Artistic and heroic flexibility, softness and maneuver are accepted and welcome in all political grounds,” said the Leader in another meeting a fortnight ago with members of the Assembly of Experts. “But maneuvers should not be interpreted as a leave to cross the red lines or step back of fundamental strategies or neglecting the ideals.”

The Leader of Iran is still suspicious about the flexibility in international dealings of the new administration as it might be induced to cross some red lines (like direct and comprehensive talks with the US) or retreat from fundamental strategies of the Islamic Republic (like supporting Palestinian cause and the Syrian government as part of the resistance front).

The Leader once again reminded the administration in his Tuesday speech that it is not allowed to neglect the “objectives and ideals” of the Islamic Revolution with excuses like “The world or the trends has changed.”

According to political observers in Tehran, the Supreme Leader has allowed the administration to expand ties with European countries, engage in direct talks with the US over the Syrian conflict, and show more flexibility in nuclear talks. The Leader has decided to let Rouhani have his try in various fields, even though he (the Leader) is not optimistic about the West’s reaction to Iran’s flexible tone; which is why the Leader stressed in his Tuesday speech that the US and the West are seeking much greatest goals in Iran’s nuclear case and that it should be taken in and well analyzed by “challenging the hegemonic system by the Islamic Revolution”.

“We do not approve of nuclear weapons not because of the US or others, but because of our beliefs; when we say no one can have nuclear weapons, we would never seek such weapons ourselves; the dissenters of Iran are after something else. These countries would never let their nuclear energy monopoly be broken,” Ayatollah Khamenei said on Tuesday.

“Diplomacy is the field of smile and calls for talks and negotiations; however, all these should be defined in the framework of our major challenge.”

Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly cautioned the new administration against the Islamic Republic’s red lines and fundamentals while exhibiting flexibility in its foreign dealings. In his earlier speech addressing members of the Assembly of Experts, the Leader certified that every “administration or person has their own methods and innovations, and are allowed to practice them in their work.”

As a key player in Iran’s power struggle during the past 34 years, the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, or Sepah, has aligned itself well with the Supreme Leader’s directions, and stood up to administrations which fail to follow the Leader’s directions. Besides, the construction projects as well as economic activities run by the Sepah are a powerful lever that can help every administration to materialize their domestic policies; which may be why the President Rowhani addressed Sepah commanders a day before the Leader to ask them to support the administration economically.

With regard to Rowhani’s concerns about acceptance of his “flexible” policies by Sepah commanders, the Supreme Leader called on Sepah top brass to temporarily step out of politics and view the developments from outside.

“Sepah is not required to meddle in political grounds, but guardianship of the Revolution needs precise understanding of realities,” the Leader said on Tuesday.

“The organization that is deemed as the Revolution’s guardian arm cannot be expected to be alien to derivative political currents,” said the Leader, stressing that under the current circumstances Sepah must, of course, identify and counter all adversaries of the Islamic Republic.

The Leader is evidently giving the administration a free hand to remedy the country’s economic and political headache by putting into effect its innovations. Likewise the Leader would be happy see that his strategic decision has helped the administration manage to fulfill its promises and receive a palatable feedback from foreigners. However, if the government fails to get the desired response from the West by being more flexible, just like the Reformist administration of Mohammad Khatami, the Leader’s warnings and pessimism against the US and enemies will be well substantiated. 

“The revolution’s future is glorious for sure, but the time of its happening depends of the performance of the nation and officials. If we are united, integrated and decisive, such a future is soon realized, but if we are infested with indolence, arrogance and other such stuff, that future will be late to come.” Ayatollah Khamenei said to the top commanders of Sepah.

The post Why Iran’s Leader Gives Rowhani Nuclear Free Hand? first appeared on .

Scores of people are stepping up for the presidency as we are witnessing more than 38 would-be candidates from the three major political parties in Iran, Principalists, Reformists and pro-governments, have registered as candidates.

Perhaps one of the significant turning points in Iran’s recent politics was the last minute registration of the three well-known figures: Saeed Jalili, secretary of the National Security Council, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of the expediency council and Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, top advisor to the president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Most analysts consider Jalili’s unforeseen appearance as the most important. They believe Hashemi Rafsanjani is the experienced man who knows the ropes and it was nothing new to Iranian voters. In the eyes of the people, Mashaei is another Ahmadinejad, as he himself said, “Ahmadinejad means Mashaei and Mashaei means Ahmadinejad.”

But who is Saeed Jalili?

Jalili graduated from one of the most important institutes of Iran, Imam Sadigh University which is headed by Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani, the current chairman of the Assembly of Experts. He went to war with Iraq in the 80s and one of his legs was amputated. But that didn’t stop him from continuing his studies.

His service as the secretary of Iran’s NSC and his handling of the sensitive nuclear program would be the most important job Jalili ever had.

“I had my high school diploma in 1983 and came to Tehran [from Mashhad] to study at the Imam Sadigh University. I received my MA in 1989 and applied for a PhD abroad. But at the same time I was recruited into the Foreign Ministry so I decided to study my PhD at Imam Sadigh University in political sociology. From 1992 to 1998 I was head of the inspection office of the foreign ministry,” Saeed Jalili wrote in his biography.

He also was in charge of one of the offices of the Supreme Leader for 4 years.

why is Jalili’s candidacy important?

Jalili 48, doesn’t  have much executive experience and is mostly seen as a diplomat. however he is very popular among Iranian voters. The Internet is filled with posters and articles supporting him and even some of the famous candidates said they are ready to step aside in favor of him.

One day after Jalili’s registration, many Principalists faced numerous questions on how they perceive his candidacy. Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel, former MP and a known Pricipalist candidate welcomed Jalili’s candidacy and said, it’s possible that our coalition of 2+1 (Adel, Mohammad- Bagher Ghalibaf and Ali Akbar Velayati) will support Jalili altogether.

Another candidate, Alireza Zakani said he is ready to unite with Jalili. The Jebheye Paydari front which is led by Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah Yzdi, a senior cleric from Qom, cited Jalili’s candidacy as being productive and helpful.

Being in the National Security Council since 2007, Jalili has become a symbol of the resistance against the demands of the west on the nuclear issue and has been leading the iranian team in negotiations with the EU and USA (P5+1).

Jalili sat down with the foreign policy authorities of Europe, China and Russia several times and boasted about  Iran’s advancement in nuclear technology as the officials of the US council of foreign policy have reportedly stated their concerns of pressures on Iran being fruitless.

 Twice Jalili rejected an invitation from a US representative in the P5+1 to have bilateral meetings . For Iranians, this shows he can confront the US.

The First time he was in Geneva when William Burns, indirectly asked him for talks, through the foreign Minister of Switzerland. The Iranian delegation rejected this and demanded a public hearing in the P5+1 meeting but the US representative wanted Jalili to listen to him anyway. finally they had a one-by-one sidebar conservation.

When back home, Saeed Jalili said, no one should act out of accord with the Supreme Leader’s will. It was perhaps an indication that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei criticized Jalili’s bilateral talk with the American undersecretary of state. So in the next rounds of talks Jalili avoided to hold bilateral talks with Americans.

In Iran, Jalili is seen as a politician close to Iran’s Leader who demands Iran’s strong role in politics and economics. He reiterated several times that the key to Iran’s success and progress, is resistance and this word is what Ayatollah Khamenei underlines in all of his speeches.

Public opinion has responded positively to Jalili’s candidacy as several people’s committees formed independent election campaigns supporting him.

Iranian people don’t have a negative memory of him, because he was never involved in domestic politics. While Hashemi’s past is filled with failures (of course along with successes) and this can be a winner for Jalili, as it was for Ahmadinejad in 2005 when his opponent was Hashemi.

*Masoud Foroghi is a student political activist and an editor of the Iranian University Student news website.

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Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili advised the so-called P5+1 group (Consisting of the USA, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany) to seize the opportunity to reach an agreement on nuclear talks with Iran.

Jalili was talking to journalists after a dinner meeting with the EU foreign policy head Catherine Ashton on Wednesday, he recalled the 2010 Iran–Brazil-Turkey deal to swap Iranian uranium stockpiles as an opportunity that the west failed to seize.

“Tehran’s declaration was about the supplying of Tehran’s medical reactor with 20% uranium but instead of seizing the opportunity they [the west] issued resolution 1929 [against Iran]” Jalili said.

Iran signed a joint declaration with Turkey and Brazil on May 16, 2010 to ship 1,200kg of low enriched uranium to Turkey for a later exchange of 120kg of enriched isotope for its medical nuclear reactor in Tehran.

 But within hours after the deal was announced by Brazilian and Turkish leaders the US rejected that and pushed ahead with sanctions.

 After the swap deal failed, Iran which was in need of 20% enriched uranium for its medical reactor developed its nuclear program to produce 20% uranium itself.

 “[After Tehran’s declaration failed] , Iran supplied itself with 20% enriched Uranium (According to the rights of NPT memebers) and [the P5+1] lost the opportunity opened up by the Tehran declaration. Then they [after three years] in Almaty-I asked to talk about 20% enrichment,” said Jalili in a press conference on Thursday morning.

 “The Iranian nation [never] retreats from its rights. I hope this time they study our proposals in the Almaty-II talks to avoid later regrets,” he said as a warning that Iran would go further on its nuclear program if the west continues to ignore Iran’s proposals.

EU foreign policy head Catherine Ashton and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili had a dinner meeting in Turkish city of Istanbul, on May 15. The meeting was a follow up to last round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 held in Almaty, Kazakhstan on April 5-6.

Speaking at a press conference after the Almaty talks, Jalili said that Iran provided a comprehensive operational plan to the P5+1 and it is now up to the group to decide on how to respond to the Iranian proposals.

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While EU foreign policy head Catherine Ashton and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili meet each other tonight in the Turkish city of Istanbul, two sides do not even have a shared vision of the content and objective of their meeting.

The dinner meeting tonight in Istanbul is a follow up to the last round of Iran – P5+1 (US, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany) nuclear talks held in Almaty, Kazakhstan on April 5th and 6th.

Dr. Jalili on arrival in Istanbul on Wednesday morning told journalists that he is expecting to “receive P5+1’s response to Iran’s proposal” which was presented in Almaty-I talks on February 26th and 27th.

Jalili said that Ashton and the P5+1 delegations promised in their final statement of Almaty-II talks to answer Iran’s proposal within several days, but now, after a long delay, he is in Istanbul to hear the result of P5+1 consultations with their foreign ministers.

On the other side, Catherine Ashton in remarks before her meeting with Saeed Jalili expressed hope to receive Iran’s respond to proposals that the P5+1 have put forward in Almaty on both occasions.

“This is not a negotiating meeting, but it is an opportunity to take time to consider further the good proposals we have put forward,” she said.

Catherine Ashton said in her statement at the end of Almaty-II talks that the P5+1 delegations will go back to their capitals to evaluate the process and later she will be in touch with Dr. Jalili in order to see how to go forward.

Ashton is also likely to get information about the Iran’s upcoming presidential election from Jalili, who may be the next Iranian president as he announced his candidacy for the upcoming Iran’s presidential election.

Iran also had a new round of negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna on Wednesday.

The ongoing talks are the 10th round of the negotiations between Iran and the IAEA over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear energy program since early 2012.

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